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Abstract
Coded caching is a technique where we utilize multi-casting opportunities to reduce rate in cached networks. One limitation
of coded caching schemes is that they reveal the demands of all users to their peers. In this work, we consider coded caching
schemes that assure privacy for user demands. We focus on reducing subpacketization in such schemes. For the 2-user, 2-file
case, we propose a new linear demand-private scheme with the lowest possible subpacketization. This is done by presenting the
scheme explicitly and proving impossibility results under lower subpacketization. We then propose new construction schemes for
placement delivery arrays. This includes direct as well as lifting constructions. Coded caching schemes based on these can achieve
lower subpacketization. A new notion of privacy with security is introduced which combines demand privacy and content security
and schemes to achieve the same are proposed. Additionally, when only partial privacy is required, we show that subpacketization
can be significantly reduced when there are a large number of files.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data traffic has been growing rapidly in recent years with content delivery, especially that of multimedia files, contributing a
significant part. One important aspect of such traffic is its temporal variation. Network usage during peak demand times could
be much higher than the demand in off-peak hours. Caching is a way to alleviate network congestion during peak hours by
prefetching popular content nearer to the user during off-peak hours. Depending on the limitations on memory, a part of these
files would be prefetched and once the user makes a demand, the rest of the requested file will be transmitted. Early literature
on caching focused on cache placement/replacement policies [1], caching architectures [4], [18], [20], web request models [3]
etc.
Maddah-Ali and Niesen had shown in their seminal paper that coding can achieve significant gain over uncoded caching by
making use of multicast opportunities [15]. Coded caching achieves an additional global caching gain, which is proportional to
the number of users. Their scheme is shown to be order optimal with an information-theoretic lower bound on the number of
files needed to be transmitted (known as rate). This scheme is later improved in [36] and is optimal for uncoded prefetching.
Though the exact lower bound on peak rate is still an open problem several works had investigated this and came up with
tighter bounds [8], [23], [31], [32], [37]. The problem has been studied in several settings like decentralized caching [16],
non-uniform demands [19], multiple levels of cache [13] to name a few. Most of the schemes in these works involve storing
the prefetched parts of files in uncoded form. Coded prefetching is investigated in [5], [9], [28], where linear combinations of
subfiles are stored in caches. In a few regimes this approach can improve the rate-memory trade-off over uncoded prefetching.
Yan et al. developed a structure called placement delivery arrays that could model both the placement and delivery schemes
in a single array [34]. Graphical models for caching have been investigated in [24], [26], [35]. Schemes can also be derived
using combinatorial designs and linear block codes [27]. A limitation with the original centralized scheme was the high
subpacketization of files [25]. In the original scheme due to [15], the number of subfiles a file is split into, increases exponentially
with the number of users. These combinatorial models have helped in developing schemes that have lower subpacketization
but with a small penalty on rate [6], [26].
One area of particular interest is security and privacy in coded caching. In typical coded caching schemes, other users
involved in the multicast or eavesdroppers might get to know the identity of the file a particular user demanded and its
contents. Furthermore, users will be able to partially access files which they have not demanded. This is in part due to the
cache that contains contents of files not requested by them and also because, during delivery, they may be able to decode packets
not meant for them. Sengupta et al. [22] proposed a method for preventing information leakage to an external wiretapper with
the use of cryptographic keys. Vaishakh et al. [21] had recently shown that the contents of a file could be revealed only to the
user/users who requested it, using secret sharing techniques.
One aspect that has not been investigated much is the privacy of the user requests in the specific context of coded caching,
while it has been studied in closely related areas like index coding [14] and private information retrieval (PIR) [7]. As we
were preparing this manuscript, we became aware of work due to Wan and Caire [30] who take a different approach for user
request privacy from ours. Another paper by Kamath [11] also addressed the problem of demand privacy and their approach
is similar to the one in this work. We point out the specific differences in our results when compared to those from [30] and
[11] below.
All authors are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai 600036, India. (Email: {ee13d205, pradeep,
andrew}@ee.iitm.ac.in)
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2In this work, we explore methods to obtain privacy of each user’s requests from the other users in coded caching keeping
subpacketization constraints as an important parameter.
Our specific contributions are as follows:
i) We focus on the 2-user, 2-file case in detail and provide an achievable multicast transmission rate versus cache storage
curve under a demand privacy constraint.
ii) For the 2-user, 2-file case with cache storage of 1 file, we show an explicit demand-private scheme achieving a multicast
transmission rate of 2/3 with a subpacketization of 3. This scheme cannot be obtained using the general scheme proposed
in [11], which, in fact, requires a subpacketization of 6.
iii) For the 2-user, 2-file case, we prove some impossibility results on subpacketization of 2 and uncoded cache storage for
linear coded caching with demand privacy. These are some of the first negative results in this new area.
iv) We propose some general construction schemes for placement delivery arrays.
v) We propose the notion of privacy with security and show how demand privacy schemes can be combined with content
security schemes to achieve this.
vi) We show how demand privacy can be incorporated into other settings including the hierarchical system of caches.
vii) Finally, we propose a general K-user, N -file partially demand-private scheme and a general scheme for non-uniform
demand privacy that provides a trade-off between the level of privacy and reduction in subpacketization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system setup and the problem statement. In
Section III, we provide demand-private schemes and an achievable rate vs cache memory curve for the case of two users and two
files. We prove certain impossibility results with respect to packetization and coded prefetching. In Section III-D, we describe
the general scheme for constructing demand-private coded caching schemes from non-private coded caching schemes from
[11], and provide specific instances of the construction from PDAs resulting in lesser subpacketization. We also introduce the
notion of partially private schemes and show how to construct a partially private scheme. We conclude with a brief discussion
on scope for future work in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System setup
Assume that we have a server with N files. Each file is assumed to be of F bits and the i-th file is denoted Wi. The
server is connected to K users via a multicast link. Each user has a cache of size MF bits. The cache contents of the i-th
user are denoted Zi. The system setup is shown in Fig. 1. The cache system works in two phases. In the first phase, called
Z1Z0 ZK´1
XD
Server
W0
W1...
WN´1
. . .
Fig. 1. Caching system with K users connected to a server with N files over a broadcast link. Server transmits XD for a demand vector
D = (D0, . . . , DK−1). User k uses the server transmission XD and its cache content Zk to recover the file it has requested, WDk .
the placement phase, the cache of each user is populated with content by the server. In addition, the server sends metadata
or header information Θ(Zi) about how the cache content was derived from the files to User i. The header information is
assumed to be small in size when compared to the file size but crucial for decoding purposes. Note that during the placement
phase the server is unaware of the files demanded by the users. We assume that the transmission of cache content and header
takes place over a private link between the server and each user.
In the second phase, called the delivery phase, each user requests the server for one of the files from the set of N files.
The demand of the i-th user is denoted Di, where Di ∈ [N ] fi {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. The demands of all the users 0 to K − 1
is denoted by the demand vector D = (D0, D1, . . . , DK−1). We assume that the Di are all i.i.d. random variables uniformly
distributed over [N ] and that the demands are sent over a private link between the user and the server. Based on the demands,
the server multicasts ` packets, typically of the same size. The entire multicast transmission from the server is denoted XD
for a demand vector D. It consists of RF bits. The transmission XD depends on the cache Zi and the demands Di. The
quantity R is called the rate of transmission. In addition to XD, some additional metadata or header information about the
3transmission is typically multicast in coded caching schemes. This metadata, denoted Θ(XD), is usually small compared to
the file size and provides critical information for decoding by the users.
The main requirement in a coded caching scheme is that User i should be able to decode the file WDi using Zi, Θ(Zi),
XD and Θ(XD). In other words, we require
H(WDi | Zi,Θ(Zi), XD,Θ(XD)) = 0. (1)
We denote a coded caching scheme with K users, N files, local cache size M , and rate R as a (K,N ;M,R) coded caching
scheme, or as a (K,N) scheme in short.
B. Demand privacy in coded caching
We will introduce the notion of demand privacy in coded caching with a simple example. Consider the (2, 2) coded caching
scheme due to Maddah-Ali and Niesen [15]. The two files, denoted A, B, are sub-packetized into two pieces each. The pieces
of A and B are denoted A0, A1 and B0, B1, respectively. The scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2.
A
B
A0, B0
Z0
A1, B1
Z1
XD
D0D1 X
D
AA A1 ⊕A0
AB A1 ⊕B0
BA B1 ⊕A0
BB B1 ⊕B0
Fig. 2. Non-private scheme from [15] for N = 2 files, K = 2 users and demand vector, D = (D0, D1).
Suppose that the demand is (A,A). This results in the transmission A1 ⊕ A0. To recover the files, each user must know
what linear combination of subfiles has been transmitted. So, we will suppose that the server sends the linear combination
information as header along with the transmission. It is easy to see that each user can recover the missing portion of the file
demanded by them. However, the scheme has the unfortunate side effect of revealing the demands of each user to the other
parties. From the header and scheme details, it is clear to User 0 that User 1 demanded the file A and vice versa.
If the transmission is Ai⊕Bj , then the i-th user can infer that the j-th user has requested A based on the linear combination
header information. In general, users can use the combined information of their cache, demands and header data from the
server to learn about another user’s demands.
Based on the preceding discussion, to achieve demand privacy in a coded caching scheme, we impose the following additional
condition for all demand vectors D:
I(Di, Zi,Θ(Zi), X
D,Θ(XD);Dj) = 0, i 6= j. (2)
In other words, we require that the i-th user is completely uncertain about what the j-th user demands, given all information
available to User i in the coded caching scheme. It can be shown that the standard Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme [15] does not
satisfy the demand privacy condition in Eq. (2).
C. Subpacketization in coded caching
Another parameter of interest in coded caching is subpacketization. It is the number of parts a file will be split into, for
the purpose of coding. For instance, it is 2 in the example given in Fig. 2. In the standard Maddah-Ali-Niesen non-private
scheme [15], the subpacketization grows exponentially with K. This limits the utility of the scheme in practical scenarios
where there may be a large number of users. Hence, reducing subpacketization is important in non-private and, consequently,
in demand-private coded caching schemes.
III. (K = 2, N = 2) CODED CACHING WITH DEMAND PRIVACY
We will first consider the case when there are two files and two users. A complete characterization of the M vs R region
in the case of two files/users was one of the starting points of the area of coded caching. Therefore, it is important to fully
characterize the same region with demand privacy. We have made some partial progress towards this problem.
First, we will show the design of a linear (2, 2; 1, 2/3) coded caching scheme with demand privacy having a subpacketization
(number of parts into which each file is divided) of 3. We will show later that this scheme provides better subpacketization
than a known lifting construction.
4A
B
A0 ‘A1
B0 ‘B1
A1 ‘B2
Z01
A0 ‘A1
B0 ‘B1
A2 ‘B1
Z00
A0 ‘A2
B0 ‘B2
A1 ‘B2
Z10
A0 ‘A2
B0 ‘B2
A2 ‘B1
Z11
A2, B2
User 0 User 1
Fig. 3. Private scheme for N = 2 files, K = 2 users. Caches assigned to each user is highlighted. The server transmits XD = {A2, B2} for demand vector,
D = (A,A).
A. (M = 1, R = 2/3) scheme with subpacketization 3
The two files, A and B, are divided into 3 parts Ai, i = 0, 1, 2 and Bi, i = 0, 1, 2. Table I summarizes the entire scheme.
TABLE I
(K = 2, N = 2;M = 1, R = 2/3) DEMAND-PRIVATE CACHING SCHEME WITH SUBPACKETIZATION 3. SERVER CAN ASSIGN CACHE AS Zi0 OR Zi1 TO
USER i. XD0D1 IS THE TRANSMISSION FOR THE DEMAND D0D1 , IF Zi0 IS ASSIGNED TO USER i.
Notation Possible cache contents
Z00 A0 ⊕A1, B0 ⊕B1, A2 ⊕B1
Z01 A0 ⊕A1, B0 ⊕B1, A1 ⊕B2
Z10 A0 ⊕A2, B0 ⊕B2, A1 ⊕B2
Z11 A0 ⊕A2, B0 ⊕B2, A2 ⊕B1
D0D1 XD0D1 (Zi0 at User i)
AA A0, B0
AB A1, B1
BA A2, B2
BB A0 ⊕A1 ⊕A2, B0 ⊕B1 ⊕B2
TABLE II
FILES RECOVERED FROM POSSIBLE CACHE PAIRS AND TRANSMISSION X FOR THE SCHEME FROM TABLE I. TRANSMISSION X FOR A PARTICULAR
CHOICE OF CACHE AND DEMAND PAIR.
Caches
Z0,Z1
X A0
B0
A1
B1
A2
B2
A0 ⊕A1 ⊕A2
B0 ⊕B1 ⊕B2
Z00,Z10 A,A A,B B,A B,B
Z00,Z11 A,B A,A B,B B,A
Z01,Z10 B,A B,B A,A A,B
Z01,Z11 B,B B,A A,B A,A
In the placement phase, the server places either Zi0 or Zi1, with equal probability, as the cache Zi for User i. This is shown
in Fig. 3. The actual choice is private between the server and User i. If user i was assigned the cache Zi0, then the multicast
transmissions XD0D1 for each possible demand (D0, D1) are as shown in Table I. It can be seen that all the demands are
served. It can also be checked that the demands are private under this assignment. For instance, from Table II, we see that
there exists another assignment of cache for each user which recovers another file with the same transmission.
Table II also specifies the transmission for a given choice of cache assignment and demand pair. For instance, if cache Z01
is assigned to User 0 and Z10 is assigned to User 1 and the demand pair is A,A, the transmission is (A2, B2).
Table III is the set of recoverable files under each possible cache content for a given transmission. For the same transmission,
each user is able to recover either file A or file B with the two possible cache contents. Since the actual cache content is
private, we readily see that this scheme satisfies the demand privacy condition in Eq. (2).
B. Dual private schemes
We show that a (2, 2;M = M1, R = R1) scheme with demand privacy can be converted into a (2, 2;M = R1, R = M1)
demand-private scheme and this results in symmetric R vs M capacity bounds for the (2, 2) case.
5TABLE III
FILES RECOVERED FROM POSSIBLE CACHES FOR A (2, 2; 1, 2/3) PRIVATE SCHEME.
XAB XBA XBB XAA
Z00 A B B A
Z01 B A A B
Z10 B A B A
Z11 A B A B
One can observe that the roles of caches and transmissions can be interchanged in the symmetric file recovery matrix in
Table III. Hence, from the scheme given in Table I, we can arrive at a scheme given in Table IV with rate R = 1 for M = 2/3.
We call this scheme the dual of the original scheme. Our next result generalizes the above for all (2, 2) private schemes that
TABLE IV
DUAL PRIVATE (2, 2; 2/3, 1) SCHEME FROM THE PRIVATE (2, 2; 1, 2/3) SCHEME GIVEN IN TABLE I. FOR CACHE Zi0 AT USER i, XD0D1 IS THE
TRANSMISSION FOR THE DEMAND D0D1 .
Notation Possible Cache Contents
Z00 A1, B1
Z01 A2, B2
Z10 A0 ⊕A1 ⊕A2, B0 ⊕B1 ⊕B2
Z11 A0, B0
D0D1 XD0D1
AA A0 ⊕A2, B0 ⊕B2, A2 ⊕B1
AB A0 ⊕A1, B0 ⊕B1, A2 ⊕B1
BA A0 ⊕A1, B0 ⊕B1, A1 ⊕B2
BB A0 ⊕A2, B0 ⊕B2, A1 ⊕B2
use one of two caches uniformly at random.
Lemma 1 (Duality of transmissions and caches). Suppose that there exists a (2, 2;M = M1, R = R1) private scheme where
the server places one of two possible cache contents uniformly at random. Then, there exists a (2, 2;M = R1, R = M1)
private scheme.
Proof. Consider a (2, 2;M,R) private scheme constructed with users having two options to populate their caches. Let
{Z00, Z01} be the set of two cache options for User 0 and {Z10, Z11} be the set of two cache options for User 1. Let XD1D2 be
the transmission corresponding to the user demands D = (D1, D2) and cache Zi0 at User i. The sets Z = {Z00, Z01, Z10, Z11}
and X = {XAA, XAB , XBA, XBB} are able to recover files A and B as given in Table III. Let the size of Zi be R1F bits
and that of XW0W1 be M1F bits. We can interchange the role of these caches and transmissions. Let {XAB , XBA} be the set
of two cache options for User 0 and {XBB , XAA} be the set of two cache options for User 1. Then if Z11 is transmitted and
the Users 0 and 1 are assigned {XAB} and {XBB} as their caches, both can recover file A. Instead if User 1 had XBA in its
cache, the users would have recovered B and A, respectively. This way of interchangeability between caches and transmissions
gives rise to a new scheme for 2 users and 2 files, where the cache size is M1 bits and transmission size is R1 bits.
A consequence of the above duality is that the achievable trade-off between memory and rate for (2, 2) private schemes is
symmetric about the line M = R.
Lemma 2 (Time sharing with file splitting). Given two achievable (M,R) pairs for a (2, 2) private scheme, all values of
(M,R) along the line joining these points are achievable.
Proof. Consider 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Split the file A into two parts Aα and Aα¯ of size αF bits and (1−α)F bits respectively. Similarly,
split B into Bα and Bα¯. Denote the two achievable private caching schemes as (2, 2;M,R) and (2, 2;M ′, R′) respectively.
We can use the (2, 2;M,R) scheme for sharing Aα and Bα and the (2, 2;M ′, R′) scheme for sharing Aα¯, and Bα¯. The overall
scheme shares A and B with effective cache size (αM + (1−α)M ′)F bits and transmission (αR+ (1−α)R′)F bits giving
a (2, 2;αM + (1− α)M ′, αR+ (1− α)R′) private scheme.
Note that the time sharing scheme in Lemma 2 has a subpacketization that is equal to the sum of the two schemes used for
time sharing. Using Lemma 2 and Lemma 1, we can plot the upper bounds for the achievable (M,R) pair for (2, 2) private
schemes. The plot is symmetric about the line M = R as can be seen in Fig. 4
C. Towards lower bounds and optimal subpacketization
Kamath et. al. had extended our results on (2, 2) private schemes by providing two more achievable (M,R) pairs and a tight
lower bound [12]. We present here a basic impossibility result involving subpacketization and coding of cache contents which
cannot be captured by a lower bound on rate. For subpacketization of 3, the scheme in Section III-A uses coded cache contents,
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Fig. 4. Achievable (M,R) region for (2, 2;M,R) private schemes. The (2, 2; 1, 2/3) scheme and its dual scheme (2, 2; 1, 2/3) have a subpacketization of
three subfiles. The straight lines are due to Lemma 2. For these schemes, the subpacketization need not be three.
which is not typical in the non-private setting. In the setting considered here for demand privacy, we have the following result
on coding in cache contents.
Theorem 3 (Necessity of coded prefetching). Consider N = 2, K = 2 with subpacketization of 3 and M = 1. If the cache
contents are not allowed to be coded (i.e. linear combinations of two or more file parts are not allowed to be stored in cache),
a rate R = 2/3 cannot be achieved with demand privacy when using a linear scheme.
Proof. A proof is given in Appendix A.
D. General Scheme
Here we describe the general scheme from [11] that provides the design of a demand-private coded caching scheme from
non-private schemes.
Theorem 4 (Existence of private schemes [11]). If there exists a (KN,N ;M,R) coded caching scheme, then there exists a
private (K,N ;M,R) scheme.
Using the Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme from [15] as the non-private scheme in Theorem 4, we obtain the following:
Corollary 5. There exists a demand private (K,N ;M,R) scheme for integer values of KM , where the rate
R =
{
K(N−M)
(1+KM) if M ≥ K−1K
N −M if M < K−1K
. (3)
Using the scheme proposed by Maddah Ali and Niesen [15, Theorem 1], for integer values of KM we can construct a
(NK,N ;M,R) non-private scheme. If KM ≥ K − 1, then R = K(N−M)(1+KM) . If 1 ≤ KM < K − 1, then R = N −M . We can
map each user in the demand-private scheme to N virtual users in the non-private scheme and extend the demand vector of
the private (K,N ;M,R) scheme to the non-private scheme using
d′j = dk + j − (k − 1)N mod N for (k − 1)N ≤ j < kN, (4)
where 0 ≤ k < K. Then, the (NK,N ;M,R) scheme from [15] gives N possible cache contents that could be stored in each
user and a transmission for each demand from which each user can recover their files. The cache memory and rate required
in the private scheme will be the same as that in the non-private scheme. More details can be found in [11]. Note that there
is no coding gain when KM < K − 1.
E. Case of two files, two users
For the N = 2, K = 2 case considered earlier, the M = 1, R = 2/3 construction presented in Section III-A is not derived
from a non-private scheme but constructed directly. In fact, a construction from the Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme using Theorem
4 results in a subpacketization of 6, when compared to the subpacketization of 3 needed for the scheme in Section III-A.
This shows that direct construction has the benefits of improved subpacketization. In general, the subacketization increases
exponentially with the number of users in the Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme. When such a non-private scheme is used to construct
a private scheme using Theorem 4, the subpacketization grows exponentially with NK. Hence reducing subpacketization
becomes a major concern in demand private schemes.
7IV. LOW SUBPACKETIZATION SCHEMES FROM PDAS
A general framework for non-private centralized coded caching schemes was proposed in [34] using placement delivery
arrays (PDAs). Some of them improve upon the Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme [15] in subpacketization or other parameters.
In this section, at first, we briefly review the concept of PDAs. Secondly, we propose new constructions of PDAs for low
subpacketization. We begin with the construction of 2-regular PDAs for a range of parameters. Then we discuss some lifting-
type constructions that can achieve higher coding gains. We also present the details of a partial Latin square based construction.
Finally, we demonstrate how they can be used to construct low subpacketization schemes for both non-private and private coded
caching schemes.
For positive integers K, f , Z and S, a (K, f, Z, S) placement delivery array is a f×K matrix P = [pj,k] with j ∈ [f ], k ∈ [K]
containing either a “˚” or integers from {0, 1, . . . , S − 1} in each cell such that they satisfy the following conditions [34].
C1. The symbol ˚ appears Z times in each column.
C2. Each integer s ∈ [S] occurs at least once in the array.
C3. If two distinct entries pj1,k1 and pj2,k2 are the same integer s ∈ [S], then
a) j1 6= j2 and k1 6= k2, i.e., they lie in distinct rows and distinct columns
b) pj1,k2 = pj2,k1 = ˚, i.e., the other two corners in the rectangle formed by (j1, k1) and (j2, k2) must be ˚.
Note that the parameters of a PDA are invariant under row and columns permutations. Existence of coded caching scheme
corresponding to a PDA was proved by Yan et al. [34].
Theorem 6 (Coded caching schemes from PDAs [34]). For a given (K, f, Z, S) PDA, P = [pj,k]f×K , there exists a
corresponding (K,N ;M,R) caching system with subpacketization f , M/N = Z/f and R = S/f .
In the caching scheme, each file Wi is split into f subfiles Wi,j , i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [f ]. Each row of the PDA corresponds to a
subfile label and if pj,k = ˚, then User k caches the j-th subfile of every file. So the cache Zk of User k is given by
Zk = {Wi,j : ∀i ∈ [N ], pj,k = ˚} (5)
For the demand vector D = {Dk : k ∈ [K]}, the server transmits
XD =
 ⊕
j∈[f ],k∈[K],pj,k=s
WDk,j : s ∈ [S]
 . (6)
In the transmission corresponding to s, User k0 has all the subfiles in its cache except WDk0 ,j0 , where j0 is such that pj0,k0 = s.
This is because, if pj,k = s for k 6= k0, then j 6= j0 and pj,k0 = ˚ by C3. So, User k0 recovers WDk0 ,j whenever pj,k0 6= ˚.
In this manner, each user can recover the entire file demanded using cache contents and transmissions.
A placement delivery array P is said to be a g-regular (K, f, Z, S) PDA, g-(K, f, Z, S) PDA or g-PDA for short, if each
integer in [S] appears g times in P . The constant g, called the coding gain [34] (or global caching gain in [15]), indicates
the number of users that recover a subfile from a single transmission. The rate of the coded caching scheme obtained from a
g-regular PDA is
R =
S(F/f)
F
=
K(f − Z)
fg
, (7)
where we have used Sg = K(f − Z) = number of integer cells in the PDA.
In some circumstances PDAs are equivalent to combinatorial objects called partial Latin squares [24]. A partial Latin square
of size n is an n × n array filled with different symbols such that every symbol appears in every row and column at most
once and some cells are allowed to be empty. A partial Latin square P is said to have the Blackburn property if whenever two
distinct cells Pj1,k1 and Pj2,k2 are occupied by the same symbol, the opposite corners Pj1,k2 and Pj2,k1 are empty. An n× n
partial Latin square with S symbols satisfying Blackburn property and Z empty cells in every column is an (n, n, Z, S)-PDA
[24]. Conversely, a (K, f, Z, S)-PDAs is a partial Latin square with Blackburn property when f = K ≥ S.
A. Constructions for PDAs
We focus on (n, n, Z, S)-PDAs that are g-regular. The corresponding (K,N ;M,R) coded caching scheme can have arbitrary
number of files N , K = n users, M = (NZ/n), and the rate R = (n−Z)/g (using Eq. (7)). We present multiple constructions
for PDAs, and they are organized into three types.
1) 2−regular constructions: We begin with a direct construction of a 2-regular PDA.
Lemma 7. For an integer n, there exists a 2-regular (n, n, 1, n(n− 1)/2) PDA.
Proof. Take an n×n array. Set all diagonal (or anti-diagonal) entries to ˚. There are S = n(n−1)/2 cells below the diagonal.
Fill them with the integers from 0 to S − 1. Symmetrically fill the cells above the diagonal.
8TABLE V
(4, 4, 1, 6), (5, 5, 1, 10) AND (6, 6, 1, 15 PDAS CREATED USING LEMMA 7.
˚ 0 1 3
0 ˚ 2 4
1 2 ˚ 5
3 4 5 ˚
0 1 2 3 ˚
4 5 6 ˚ 3
7 8 ˚ 6 2
9 ˚ 8 5 1
˚ 9 7 4 0
0 1 2 3 4 ˚
5 6 7 8 ˚ 4
9 10 11 ˚ 8 3
12 13 ˚ 11 7 2
14 ˚ 13 10 6 1
˚ 14 12 9 5 0
Examples with n = 4 (diagonal) and n = 5 (anti-diagonal) are shown in Table V. The PDAs constructed using Lemma 7
is similar in structure to the PDA corresponding to Maddah-Ali-Niesen schemes [19] for t = KMN = 1.
So far, in an (n, n, Z, S) PDA, we have considered S to be a positive integer and used the integers {0, 1, . . . , S−1} to
populate the array. We will now generalise and consider populating the array with a set of distinct integers S. Such PDAs are
denoted either (n, n, Z,S) or (n, n, Z, |S|) PDAs
In an (n, n, Z,S) PDA, |S| determines the rate of the corresponding coded caching scheme. In the simple construction of
Lemma 7, |S|= n(n − 1)/2. We now provide methods to modify a PDA P from Lemma 7 to lower |S|, while retaining
regularity of 2. The basic idea is to replace integers in P with ˚ without affecting regularity.
For this purpose, given a 2-regular (n, n, Z,S) PDA P with rows/columns indexed from 0 to n− 1 and s ∈ S at locations
(i1(s), j1(s)) and (i2(s), j2(s)), we associate a graph G(P ) = (V,E) with vertex set V = {0, 1, . . . , n−1} representing the
columns of P and edge set E = {(j2(s), j1(s)) : s ∈ S}. We refer the reader to [10] for definitions and basic results in graph
theory. The edge e(s) = (j2(s), j1(s)) ∈ E is labelled with the triple (i1(s), i2(s), s). For a symmetric PDA P (such as the
one from Lemma 7), since i2(s) = j1(s) and j2(s) = i1(s), we have e(s) = (i1(s), j1(s)) and the edge label is shortened to
s.
Lemma 8. Let P be the 2-regular (n, n, 1, n(n − 1)/2) PDA from Lemma 7. Then, the associated graph G(P ) is equal to
Kn, the complete graph on n vertices.
Proof. By symmetry, the first column of P is equal to the first row, if diagonal is set to ˚, or the last row, if anti-diagonal is
set to ˚. So, in G(P ), vertex 1 is connected to all other vertices ≥ 2.
Now, delete the first column and its corresponding first or last symmetric row, and see that vertex 2 is connected to vertices
≥ 3. Proceed iteratively to complete the proof.
A spanning subgraph has the same vertex set as the original graph and a subset of its edges with no isolated vertices. A
graph or subgraph is said to be r-regular if every vertex has degree equal to r. An r-regular spanning subgraph is very useful
for modifying PDAs as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Consider a 2-regular (n, n, z,S) PDA P and its associated graph G(P ). Suppose G(P ) has an r-regular spanning
subgraph with its nr/2 edges being {e(s) : s ∈ Sr}, where Sr ⊂ S. The array obtained by setting s ∈ Sr as ˚ in P is a
2-regular (n, n, z + r,S \ Sr) PDA.
Proof. Since the subgraph is spanning and r-regular, exactly r integers in Sr are present in each column of P . So, setting the
integers in Sr to ˚ results in the modified PDA as claimed.
To find regular spanning subgraphs, the notions of 1-factors and 1-factorization are useful [29]. A matching in a graph is a
set of non-intersecting (or parallel) edges. A matching is said to be a 1-factor if it covers all vertices. A 1-factor is clearly a
1-regular spanning subgraph.
A complete graph Kn, for n even, has multiple 1-factors each with n/2 edges [29]. A 1-factorization of Kn, n even, is a
partition of its n(n−1)/2 edges into n−1 edge-disjoint 1-factors. It is well known that 1-factorizations exist for Kn when n
is even [17]. The union of r different 1-factors in a 1-factorization is clearly an r-regular spanning subgraph of Kn, which
can be used in Lemma 9 as follows.
Lemma 10. Let P be the 2-regular (n, n, 1, n(n−1)/2) PDA from Lemma 7 with associated graph Kn, n even. Let {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn−1}
be a 1-factorization of Kn with the i-th 1-factor Mi = {e(sij) : j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n/2}}. For z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−2}, let Pz be the
array obtained by setting sij to˚ in P for 1 ≤ i ≤ z and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n/2}. Then, Pz is a 2-regular (n, n, z+1, n(n−z−1)/2)
PDA.
Proof. Since M1 ∪M2 ∪ · · · ∪Mz is a z-regular spanning subgraph of Kn, the result follows by the use of Lemma 9.
For n = 4, consider the (4, 4, 1, 6) PDA in Table V. A 1-factorization for the associated graph is M1 = {e(0), e(5)},
M2 = {e(1), e(4)}, M3 = {e(2), e(3)}. The modified PDAs obtained using this 1-factorization in Lemma 10 are easy to write
down.
9For n odd, there are no 1-factors in Kn, and the smallest regular spanning subgraph is a Hamiltonian cycle, which is a
cycle with n edges passing through all n vertices [10]. It is well-known that Kn for n odd can be decomposed into (n− 1)/2
edge-disjoint Hamiltonian cycles [2], [29]. This decomposition leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 11. Let P be the 2-regular (n, n, 1, n(n−1)/2) PDA from Lemma 7 with associated graph Kn, n odd. Let {H1, H2, . . . ,H(n−1)/2}
be a set of edge-disjoint Hamiltonian cycles of Kn with Hi = {e(sij) : j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}}. For z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , (n−3)/2},
let Pz be the array obtained by setting sij to ˚ in P for 1 ≤ i ≤ z and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then, Pz is a 2-regular
(n, n, 2z + 1, n(n−2z−1)/2) PDA.
Proof. Since H1 ∪H2 ∪ · · · ∪Hz is a 2z-regular spanning subgraph of Kn, the result follows by the use of Lemma 9.
For n = 5, consider the (5, 5, 1, 10) PDA in Table V. A Hamiltonian cycle decomposition for the associated graph is
H1 = {e(0), e(1), e(5), e(6), e(7)}, H2 = {e(2), e(8), e(9), e(4), e(3)}. The modified PDAs obtained using this decomposition
in Lemma 11 are easy to write down.
We will conclude this section on modifying PDAs by providing explicit constructions of 1-factors and regular spanning
subgraphs for the graph G(P ) associated with different types of PDAs P . Let P 1,n be the (n(n − 1)/2 PDA created using
Lemma 7 for n even (anti-diagonal) with pi,j = ˚ if i+ j = n− 1. The integers are placed row-wise above the anti-diagonal
as in the n = 6 example in Table V. Define the l-th diagonal (0 ≤ l ≤ n−1) of a PDA P to be the cells (i, j) such that
j = (i+ l) (mod n). The l-th diagonal is called even if l is even, and odd otherwise. The following two properties are easy
to establish for P 1,n.
1) The ˚s in P 1,n occur only in the odd diagonals.
2) Every even diagonal has n/2 distinct integers with each integer occurring twice and no ˚.
So, we see that the n/2 even diagonals are edge-disjoint 1-factors of G(P 1,n).
All the odd diagonals of P 1,n together form an (n/2 − 1)-regular spanning subgraph. Using this spanning subgraph in
Lemma 9, we obtain a PDA, which we call P 2,n. It can be shown that P 2,n is a 2-regular (n, n, n/2, n2/4) PDA. Further,
the even diagonals of P 2,n continue to be 1-factors of G(P 2,n).
Example IV.1. Constructions using P 1,n and P 2,n for n = 6 are demonstrated in Fig 5.
P 1,6¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
0 1 2 3 4 ˚
5 6 7 8 ˚ 4
9 10 11 ˚ 8 3
12 13 ˚ 11 7 2
14 ˚ 13 10 6 1
˚ 14 12 9 5 0
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‚
0-th diag“˚ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
˚ 1 2 3 4 ˚
5 ˚ 7 8 ˚ 4
9 10 ˚ ˚ 8 3
12 13 ˚ ˚ 7 2
14 ˚ 13 10 ˚ 1
˚ 14 12 9 5 ˚
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‚
2-nd diag“˚ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
˚ 1 ˚ 3 4 ˚
5 ˚ 7 ˚ ˚ 4
9 10 ˚ ˚ ˚ 3
12 13 ˚ ˚ 7 ˚
˚ ˚ 13 10 ˚ 1
˚ ˚ 12 9 5 ˚
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‚
4-th diag“˚ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
˚ 1 ˚ 3 ˚ ˚
5 ˚ 7 ˚ ˚ ˚
˚ 10 ˚ ˚ ˚ 3
12 ˚ ˚ ˚ 7 ˚
˚ ˚ ˚ 10 ˚ 1
˚ ˚ 12 ˚ 5 ˚
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‚
P 2,6¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
0 ˚ 2 ˚ 4 ˚
˚ 6 ˚ 8 ˚ 4
9 ˚ 11 ˚ 8 ˚
˚ 13 ˚ 11 ˚ 2
14 ˚ 13 ˚ 6 ˚
˚ 14 ˚ 9 ˚ 0
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‚
0-th diag“˚ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
˚ ˚ 2 ˚ 4 ˚
˚ ˚ ˚ 8 ˚ 4
9 ˚ ˚ ˚ 8 ˚
˚ 13 ˚ ˚ ˚ 2
14 ˚ 13 ˚ ˚ ˚
˚ 14 ˚ 9 ˚ ˚
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‚
2-nd diag“˚ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ 4 ˚
˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ 4
9 ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚
˚ 13 ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚
˚ ˚ 13 ˚ ˚ ˚
˚ ˚ ˚ 9 ˚ ˚
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‚
Fig. 5. Constructing new PDAs from arrays P 1,6 and P 2,6. The array P 1,6 is obtained using Lemma 7 for n = 6. The array P 2,6 is obtained by replacing
the integers in the odd diagonals of P 1,6 with ˚. Integers in the even diagonals are replaced with ˚ in P 1,6 and P 2,6 to create new PDAs.
Next, we consider the case of P 1,n when n is odd and anti-diagonal elements are set as ˚. In this case, for 0 ≤ j ≤ (n−3)/2,
it can be shown that the locations (j, j), (n−1−j, n−1−j), (2j+1)-th diagonal and (n−2j−1)-th diagonal in P 1,n form a
Hamiltonian cycle in G(P 1,n). This provides the necessary Hamiltonian cycle decomposition.
Example IV.2. For n = 7, a 2-(7, 7, 3, 14) PDA is constructed from a 2-(7, 7, 1, 21) PDA as shown below in Fig. 6 using the
Hamiltonian cycle (highlighted locations) with j = 2.
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¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
0 1 2 3 4 5 ˚
6 7 8 9 10 ˚ 5
11 12 13 14 ˚ 10 4
15 16 17 ˚ 14 9 3
18 19 ˚ 17 13 8 2
20 ˚ 19 16 12 7 1
˚ 20 18 15 11 6 0
0 1 ˚ 3 4 ˚ ˚
6 7 8 ˚ 10 ˚ ˚
˚ 12 ˚ 14 ˚ 10 4
15 ˚ 17 ˚ 14 ˚ 3
18 19 ˚ 17 ˚ 8 ˚
˚ ˚ 19 ˚ 12 7 1
˚ ˚ 18 15 ˚ 6 0
Fig. 6. A (7, 7, 3, 14) PDA constructed from a (7, 7, 1, 21) PDA.
2) Lifting or protograph-type constructions: The constructions in Lemmas 10 and 11 create PDAs with the same size and
same coding gain as of the original PDA. To increase coding gain and obtain g-regular PDAs for g > 2, we employ the idea
of lifting or protograph construction. Similar to the popular notion of protograph or lifted LDPC codes, we start with a base
PDA, and replace each entry with another PDA. An important difference when lifting PDAs is that we have to ensure that the
Blackburn property is preserved during the lifting.
The component PDAs used in the lifting construction are as follows.
1) In(t) denotes the (n, n, n− 1, 1) PDA with the integer t on the main diagonal and ˚ in all other cells. I˜n(t) denotes the
(n, n, n− 1, 1) PDA with the integer t on the main anti-diagonal and ˚ in all other cells. For example,
I3(1) =
¨˚
˝1 ˚ ˚˚ 1 ˚
˚ ˚ 1
‹˛‚, I˜3(0) =
¨˚
˝˚ ˚ 0˚ 0 ˚
0 ˚ ˚
‹˛‚.
2) Gn(S) and Hn(S) denote the (n, n, 1,S) PDAs obtained using Lemma 7 with anti-diagonal and diagonal cells set as ˚,
respectively. The set S is ordered and contains n(n− 1)/2 integers, which are arranged row-wise above the anti-diagonal
in Gn(S) or below the diagonal in Hn(S). For example,
G3(4, 6, 5) =
¨˚
˝4 6 ˚5 ˚ 6
˚ 5 4
‹˛‚, H3(13, 12, 11) =
¨˚
˝˚ 13 1213 ˚ 11
12 11 ˚
‹˛‚.
In the first lifting method, we start with a base PDA and replace ˚’s with an all-˚ array, and replace integers with PDAs that
contain disjoint sets of integers.
Lemma 12. Let Pb be a (K, f, Z,Sb) PDA. Let an array P be defined as follows:
1) Each ˚ in Pb is replaced by an a× b all-˚ array.
2) Each integer i ∈ Sb is replaced by an (a, b, e,Si) PDA, where Si, Sj are disjoint for i6=j.
Then, P is a (Ka, fb, Za+ (f − Z)e,S) PDA, where S = ⋃i∈Sb Si.
Proof. Clearly, P is an fb × Ka array. Each column of Pb has Z ˚’s and f − Z integers. So, each column of P has
Za+ (f − Z)e ˚’s.
Since each column of Pb has distinct integers and distinct integers are replaced with PDAs containing disjoint sets of integers,
each column of P has distinct integers as well.
Finally, we need to verify the Blackburn property for P . Let pi,j and qi,j denote the (i, j)-th elements of Pb and P ,
respectively. Let i/b denote the quotient when i is divided by b, and let j/a be defined similarly. If qi1,j1 = qi2,j2 = s in the
lifted PDA P , we necessarily have that pi1/b,j1/a = pi2/b,j2/a in the base PDA Pb because different integers are expanded to
PDAs containing disjoint sets of integers. So, we have pi1/b,j2/a = pi2/b,j1/a = ˚ by the Blackburn property. Since an ˚ is
replaced by an all-˚ array, qi1,j2 = qi2,j1 = ˚ in P and the Blackburn property is satisfied.
Example IV.3. Two PDAs obtained using Lemma 12 are shown in Table VI. The first one is with Pb =
¨˚
˝0 1 23 4 5
6 7 8
‹˛‚ and
integer i replaced with I3(i) resulting in a 3-regular (9, 9, 6, 9) PDA. The second one uses Pb =
¨˚
˝˚ 0 10 ˚ 2
1 2 ˚
‹˛‚with 0 replaced
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by G3(0, 1, 2), 1 replaced by H3(3, 4, 5) and 2 replaced by G3(6, 7, 8) resulting in a 4-regular (9, 9, 5, 9) PDA.
TABLE VI
EXAMPLES OF LIFTING USING LEMMA 12.
0 ˚ ˚ 1 ˚ ˚ 2 ˚ ˚
˚ 0 ˚ ˚ 1 ˚ ˚ 2 ˚
˚ ˚ 0 ˚ ˚ 1 ˚ ˚ 2
3 ˚ ˚ 4 ˚ ˚ 5 ˚ ˚
˚ 3 ˚ ˚ 4 ˚ ˚ 5 ˚
˚ ˚ 3 ˚ ˚ 4 ˚ ˚ 5
6 ˚ ˚ 7 ˚ ˚ 8 ˚ ˚
˚ 6 ˚ ˚ 7 ˚ ˚ 8 ˚
˚ ˚ 6 ˚ ˚ 7 ˚ ˚ 8
˚ ˚ ˚ 0 1 ˚ ˚ 3 4
˚ ˚ ˚ 2 ˚ 1 3 ˚ 5
˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ 2 0 4 5 ˚
0 1 ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ 6 7 ˚
2 ˚ 1 ˚ ˚ ˚ 8 ˚ 7
˚ 2 0 ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ 8 6
˚ 3 4 6 7 ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚
3 ˚ 5 8 ˚ 7 ˚ ˚ ˚
4 5 ˚ ˚ 8 6 ˚ ˚ ˚
The second lifting method we propose is for 2-regular base PDAs. In this method, a ˚ in the base PDA will be replaced
by the PDA In(t), which has integers on the diagonal. So, the two occurrences of every integer in the base PDA have to
be replaced so that the Blackburn property is not violated. The following definition characterizes non-violation of Blackburn
property during lifting.
Two n × n PDAs P1 = [p(1)ij ] and P2 = [p(2)ij ] are said to be Blackburn-compatible with respect to (w.r.t.) a third n × n
PDA P0 = [p
(0)
ij ] if, whenever p
(1)
i1j1
=p
(2)
i2j2
6=˚, we have p(0)i1j2=p
(0)
i2j1
= ˚. Firstly, we see that any two PDAs are Blackburn-
compatible w.r.t. the trivial all-˚ PDA, and this enables the lifting method of Lemma 12. Next, the following two PDAs A3(x)
and A′3(x) are examples of PDAs that are Blackburn-compatible w.r.t. I3(t):
A3(x) =
¨˚
˝ ˚ x+ 2 x+ 1x+ 2 ˚ x
x+ 3 x ˚
‹˛‚, A′3(x) =
¨˚
˝ x x+ 1 ˚x+ 3 ˚ x+ 1
˚ x+ 3 x+ 2
‹˛‚. (8)
Note that there are 4 distinct integers occurring in A3(x) and A′3(x). The following two PDAs A4(x) and A
′
4(x) with 6 distinct
integers are Blackburn-compatible w.r.t. I4(t):
A4(x) =
¨˚
˚˝˚ x+ 2 x+ 4 x+ 1 ˚x+ 5 x+ 3 ˚ x+ 1
x ˚ x+ 3 x+ 4
˚ x x+ 5 x+ 2
‹˛‹‹‚, A′4(x) =
¨˚
˚˝˚ x+ 3 x+ 4 x+ 1 ˚x+ 5 x+ 2 ˚ x+ 1
x ˚ x+ 2 x+ 4
˚ x x+ 5 x+ 3
‹˛‹‹‚. (9)
The following two PDAs with 4 distinct integers are Blackburn-compatible w.r.t. I4(t):
C4(x) =
¨˚
˚˝˚ ˚ x+ 2 x+ 1 ˚x+ 3 ˚ ˚ x+ 1
x ˚ ˚ x+ 2
˚ x x+ 3 ˚
‹˛‹‹‚, C ′4(x) =
¨˚
˚˝˚ ˚ x+ 2 x+ 1 ˚x+ 3 ˚ ˚ x+ 1
x ˚ ˚ x+ 2
˚ x x+ 3 ˚
‹˛‹‹‚. (10)
Other such examples can be readily constructed for larger-sized PDAs as well.
Lifting of 2-regular PDAs using Blackburn-compatibility of PDAs is described in the next lemma.
Lemma 13. Let Pb be a 2-regular (K, f, Z,Sb) PDA. Let an array P be defined as follows:
1) There are KZ ˚’s in Pb. The t-th ˚ is replaced by In(t), t ∈ [KZ].
2) The two occurrences of an integer i ∈ Sb are replaced by two (n, n, e,Si) PDAs that are Blackburn-compatible w.r.t.
In(t), where Si
⋂
[KZ] = φ and Si, Sj are disjoint for i6=j.
Then, P is a (Kn, fn, Z(n−1)+(f−Z)e,S) PDA, where S = [KZ]⋃ p⋃i∈Sb Siq.
Proof. The parameters of P are established easily. No row or column has repeating integers by the disjointedness of the sets.
The Blackburn-compatibility ensures that P satisfies the Blackburn property after lifting.
Using 2-regular PDAs obtained from Lemmas 7 and 10 as base PDAs and lifting using the Blackburn-compatible 3 × 3
PDAs in (8) and 4× 4 PDAs in (9), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 14. (a) For n even, there exist c-regular (cn, cn, n + (c − 2)z, nz + (c − 1)n(n − z)) PDAs for c = 3, 4 and
z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
(b) For n even, there exist 4-regular (4n, 4n, n+ 2z + 1, nz + 3n(n− z)− n) PDA for z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}.
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Proof. (a) The construction is that of Lemma 13 with the 2-regular (n, n, z, n(n− z)/2) base PDA from Lemma 7 for z = 1
and Lemma 10 for 2 ≤ z ≤ n− 1. For z = n, the all-˚ PDA is used as the base PDA.
To replace an integer i occurring twice in the base PDA, the c× c PDAs Ac(xi) and A′c(xi) from (8) for c = 3 and (9) for
c = 4 are used with xi = nz + 2(c− 1)i, which ensures disjointedness for different values of i.
Finally, the c-regularity of the lifted PDA follows because each integer in [nz] occurs c times in Ic(t) and each integer in
Ac(xi) and A′c(xi) occurs c times as well.
(b) Once again, the construction is that of Lemma 13 with the 2-regular (n, n, z, n(n − z)/2) base PDA from Lemma 7 for
z = 1 and Lemma 10 for 2 ≤ z ≤ n− 1.
Select a 1-factor of the base PDA (say, an even diagonal) and replace an integer i occurring twice in the 1-factor with
C4(xi) and C ′4(xi), where xi = nz + 6i. Any other integer j occurring twice outside of the chosen 1-factor is replaced with
A4(xj) and A′4(xj).
Since C4(x) and C ′4(x) contain 2 ˚’s per column, the number of ˚’s in the lifted PDA increases by 1 when compared to
Part (a). Since the number of distinct integers in C4(x) and C ′4(x) is 4, which is lesser by 2, when compared to 6, the number
of distinct integers in the lifted PDA decreases by 2× n/2 = n when compared to Part (a).
Note that the second lifting construction improves the coding gain from 2 to c (3 or 4). A (12, 12, 5, 21) PDA constructed
from a (3, 3, 1, 3) PDA using Corollary 14 (Part (a)) is given below.
(3, 3, 1, 3) PDA¨˚
˝˚ 0 10 ˚ 2
1 2 ˚
‹˛‚ Cor 14−−−−−−−→
(12, 12, 5, 21) PDA¨˚
˝ I4(0) A4(3) A4(9)A′4(3) I4(1) A4(15)
A′4(9) A
′
4(15) I4(2)
‹˛‚
0 ˚ ˚ ˚ 5 7 4 ˚ 11 13 10 ˚
˚ 0 ˚ ˚ 8 6 ˚ 4 14 12 ˚ 10
˚ ˚ 0 ˚ 3 ˚ 6 7 9 ˚ 12 13
˚ ˚ ˚ 0 ˚ 3 8 5 ˚ 9 14 11
6 7 4 ˚ 1 ˚ ˚ ˚ 17 19 16 ˚
8 5 ˚ 4 ˚ 1 ˚ ˚ 20 18 ˚ 16
3 ˚ 5 7 ˚ ˚ 1 ˚ 15 ˚ 18 19
˚ 3 8 6 ˚ ˚ ˚ 1 ˚ 15 20 17
12 13 10 ˚ 18 19 16 ˚ 2 ˚ ˚ ˚
14 11 ˚ 10 20 17 ˚ 16 ˚ 2 ˚ ˚
9 ˚ 11 13 15 ˚ 17 19 ˚ ˚ 2 ˚
˚ 9 14 12 ˚ 15 20 18 ˚ ˚ ˚ 2
Recasting the parameters of the PDAs obtained using Corollary 14 (Parts (a) and (b)), we obtain the following:
Corollary 15. For c ∈ {3, 4} and integer n divisible by 2c, there exists c-regular
´
n, n, z, n(n−z)c
¯
PDA for integers z ∈
{nc + 1, nc + 2, . . . , (c−1)nc }.
Proof. In Corollary 14 (Part (a)), we set n′ = cn and z′ = n+(c−2)z and simplify. In Corollary 14 (Part (a)), we set n′ = 4n
and z′ = n+ 2z + 1 and simplify.
Example IV.4. A 4-regular (24, 24, 11, 78) PDA from Corollary 15 is illustrated in Fig. 7. The base PDA is (6, 6, 2, 12). The
1-factor replaced with C4(x) and C ′4(x) has been highlighted.
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¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
˚ 0 1 2 3 ˚
4 ˚ 5 6 ˚ 3
7 8 ˚ ˚ 6 2
9 10 ˚ ˚ 5 1
11 ˚ 10 8 ˚ 0
˚ 11 9 7 4 ˚
I4p0q A4p12q C4p18q A4p22q A4p28q I4p1q
A4p34q I4p2q A4p40q C4p46q I4p3q A14p28q
A4p50q A4p56q I4p4q I4p5q C 14p46q A14p22q
A4p62q A4p68q I4p6q I4p7q A14p40q C 14p18q
C4p74q I4p8q A14p68q A14p56q I4p9q A14p12q
I4p10q C 14p74q A14p62q A14p50q A14p34q I4p11q
Fig. 7. A (24, 24, 11, 78) PDA constructed from a (6, 6, 2, 12) PDA using Corollary 15.
Corollary 15 clearly brings out the coding gain of 3- and 4-regular lifted PDAs when compared to the 2-regular PDAs of
the same size from Lemma 10.
Finally, to show the versatility of the lifting construction, we provide a construction for 8-regular PDAs. The following two
8× 8 PDAs are Blackburn-compatible w.r.t. I˜8(t) as can be directly verified.
A8(x) =
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
x ˚ ˚ ˚ x+ 5 x+ 6 x+ 3 ˚
˚ x ˚ ˚ x+ 7 x+ 4 ˚ x+ 3
˚ ˚ x ˚ x+ 2 ˚ x+ 4 x+ 6
˚ ˚ ˚ x ˚ x+ 2 x+ 7 x+ 5
x+ 4 x+ 6 x+ 3 ˚ x+ 1 ˚ ˚ ˚
x+ 7 x+ 5 ˚ x+ 3 ˚ x+ 1 ˚ ˚
x+ 2 ˚ x+ 5 x+ 6 ˚ ˚ x+ 1 ˚
˚ x+ 2 x+ 7 x+ 4 ˚ ˚ ˚ x+ 1
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
(11a)
A′8(x) =
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
x ˚ ˚ ˚ x+ 4 x+ 7 x+ 2 ˚
˚ x ˚ ˚ x+ 6 x+ 5 ˚ x+ 2
˚ ˚ x ˚ x+ 3 ˚ x+ 5 x+ 7
˚ ˚ ˚ x ˚ x+ 3 x+ 6 x+ 4
x+ 5 x+ 7 x+ 2 ˚ x+ 1 ˚ ˚ ˚
x+ 6 x+ 4 ˚ x+ 2 ˚ x+ 1 ˚ ˚
x+ 3 ˚ x+ 4 x+ 7 ˚ ˚ x+ 1 ˚
˚ x+ 3 x+ 6 x+ 5 ˚ ˚ ˚ x+ 1
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
(11b)
Corollary 16. Given a 2-regular (K, f, Z,S) PDA P , there exists an 8-regular (8K, 8f, 4f + 3Z, 8|S|+KZ) PDA.
Proof. The construction is that of Lemma 13 with the given 2-regular base PDA P , ˚ replaced by I˜8(t), t ∈ [KZ], and integers
replaced by the 8× 8 PDAs A8(xi) from (11a) and A′8(xi) from (11b) with xi = KZ + 8i. Since I˜8(t) has 7 ˚’s per column
and A8(xi), A′8(xi) have 4 ˚’s per column, the number of ˚ in each column of the lifted PDA is (Z)7+(f−Z)4 = 4f+3Z.
The other parameter values are easy to establish.
3) Partial Latin square construction: The next construction is based on Wanless’ construction of partial latin squares with
Blackburn property [33]. This is an algebraic construction and can provide various different values for regularity determined
by the existence of certain constrained sets.
Explicit constructions of PDAs and coded caching schemes using Wanless’ construction of partial Latin squares have not
appeared in the literature. So, we provide some details. Let Zn denote the ring of integers {0, 1, . . . , n−1} modulo n. A subset
S ⊆ Zn, n: odd, satisfies the law of excluded middle (LEM) property if
x+ y
2
/∈ S,∀x, y ∈ S, x 6= y. (12)
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Lemma 17 (Wanless construction). Suppose S is a subset of Zn, n: odd, satisfying LEM. There exists an |S|-regular (n, n, n−
|S|, n) PDA.
Proof. Let P = [pj,k], j, k ∈ Zn, be defined as
pj,k =
{
1
2 (j + k) if k − j ∈ S,
˚ otherwise.
(13)
We claim that P is a |S|-regular (n, n, n− |S|, n) PDA.
For Zn with odd n, 12 (j+k1) ≡ 12 (j+k2) mod n only when k1 ≡ k2 mod n. This ensures no duplication in rows. Similarly,
there is no duplication in columns.
For verifying that P has Blackburn property, assume that cells (j1, k1) and (j2, k2) are such that k1 − j1, k2 − j2 ∈ S and
1
2
(j1 + k1) =
1
2
(j2 + k2) mod n. (14)
Because of LEM, 12 (k1 − j1 + k2 − j2) /∈ S. So, we have
k1 − j2 = 1
2
(k1 − j1 + k2 − j2) + 1
2
(j1 + k1)− 1
2
(j2 + k2) /∈ S
implying that the cell (j2, k1) contains an ˚. Similarly, we can show that the cell (j1, k2) contains an ˚.
The number of ˚s in each column is readily seen to be n− |S|. For every i ∈ Zn and s ∈ S, i = 12 (j + k) and s = k − j
has a unique solution for (j, k). So, every element of Zn occurs |S| times in the PDA P .
A list of maximal subsets satisfying LEM is given in Table VII. The maximal subsets need not be unique. As an example,
a PDA constructed using Lemma 17 for S = {0, 1, 3, 4} ∈ Z9 is given in Table VIII.
TABLE VII
MAXIMAL SUBSETS OF Zn SATISFYING LEM FOR ODD INTEGERS FROM {3, . . . , 25}.
n A maximal subset of Zn with LEM Size
3 {0, 1} 2
5 {0, 1} 2
7 {0, 1, 3 } 3
9 {0, 1, 3, 4} 4
11 {0, 1, 3, 4} 4
13 {0, 1, 3, 4} 4
15 {0, 1, 3, 4} 4
17 {0, 1, 3, 7, 8} 5
19 {0, 1, 3, 12, 14, 15} 6
21 {0, 1, 3, 4, 9, 10} 6
23 {0, 1, 3, 4, 9, 10} 6
25 {0, 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12} 7
TABLE VIII
A (9, 9, 5, 9) PDA CREATED USING WANLESS’ CONSTRUCTION (LEMMA 17) FOR {0, 1, 3, 4} ∈ Z9 .
1 6 ˚ 7 3 ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚
˚ 2 7 ˚ 8 4 ˚ ˚ ˚
˚ ˚ 3 8 ˚ 0 5 ˚ ˚
˚ ˚ ˚ 4 0 ˚ 1 6 ˚
˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ 5 1 ˚ 2 7
8 ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ 6 2 ˚ 3
4 0 ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ 7 3 ˚
˚ 5 1 ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ 8 4
5 ˚ 6 2 ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ 0
The parameters of all the coded caching schemes derived from the PDAs that we have presented above are summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 18. There exist (K,N ;M,R) coded caching schemes for the parameters tabulated below.
15
Construction
Common
Parameters
PDA Caching Scheme
Constraints
K f g Z S MN R
Lemma 7 n n 2 1 n(n−1)2
1
n
n−1
2
Lemma 10 n n 2 z n(n−z)2
z
n
n−z
2
n is even
z ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
Lemma 11 n n 2 2i+ 1 n(n−1−2i)2
2i+1
n
n−1−2i
2
n is odd
i ∈ {0, . . . , n−32 }
Corollary 15 n n c z n(n−z)c
z
n
n−z
c
c ∈ {3, 4}, 2c|n
z ∈ {nc + 1, nc + 2, . . . , (c−1)nc }
Lemma 17 n n i n− i n n−in 1
S ⊆ Zn satisfies LEM
|S|= q, i ∈ {1, . . . , q}
A comparison of these coded caching schemes with the Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme for K = N = 24 is shown in Fig. 8.
The PDA-based constructions are for K = 24 using Corollary 15, which is possible for c = 3, 4 since both 6 and 8 divides
24. The PDA-based schemes from Lemma 10 and from Corollary 15 are close to the Maddah-Ali-Niesen (MN) scheme at
different parts of the rate versus memory trade-off curve.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of memory-rate tradeoff between the PDA-based schemes and Maddah-Ali-Niesen (MN) scheme. Rate (R) and subpacketization (f) are
plotted against normalized cache memory (M
N
) for K = 24.
The comparison of subpacketization clearly shows the advantage in the PDA-based schemes over the MN scheme. For
instance, when K = 24, MN = 11 and N ≥ 24, the (24, 24, 11, 78) PDA in Example IV.4 gives a scheme with R = 3.25 and
f = 24. For these parameters, the matching Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme has R = 1.083 with f = 2496144 and the uncoded
caching has R = 13. Since the subpacketization in Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme could become very large in some situations,
the PDA-based schemes become practical even if they have a lower rate.
B. Demand private schemes from PDAs
We have seen that there are several construction schemes for PDAs which reduce the subpacketization in coded-caching
schemes when compared to the Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme, although with a penalty on rate. We can construct demand-
private schemes from the non-private schemes constructed from PDAs using Theorem 4 and achieve a significantly lower
subpacketization.
Corollary 19 (Private schemes from PDAs). If there exists a (NK, f, Z, S) placement delivery array, we can obtain a private
(K,N ; NZf ,
S
f ) coded caching scheme, for any N .
Proof. Given a (NK, f, Z, S) placement delivery array, there exists a non-private (NK,N ; NZf ,
S
f ) (see [34] for details). From
this we can obtain the private (K,N ; NZf ,
S
f ) scheme using Theorem 4.
Since the number of ”virtual” users become NK in the demand-private scheme, reducing subpacketization is even more
significant in the context of demand privacy.
To illustrate the construction of demand-private schemes, we show a couple of complete examples.
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Example IV.5. We now present an example of a private scheme with N = 2, K = 3, derived from a PDA. Consider the PDA
from [34, Eq. (7)] corresponding to 6 users and 4 subfiles.
P =
¨˚
˚˝˚ ∗ 1 ∗ 2 ∗ 00 ∗ ∗ 3 1 ∗
∗ 3 0 ∗ 2 ∗
2 ∗ 1 ∗ ∗ 3
‹˛‹‹‚ (15)
We assume that each file Wi is split into f = 4 subfiles which are denoted as Wi,j , where 0 ≤ j < f . In the non-private
scheme, the cache contents of the i-th user are given below.
Z ′0 = {Wi,0,Wi,2 : i ∈ [0, 2)}
Z ′1 = {Wi,1,Wi,3 : i ∈ [0, 2)}
Z ′2 = {Wi,0,Wi,1 : i ∈ [0, 2)}
Z ′3 = {Wi,2,Wi,3 : i ∈ [0, 2)}
Z ′4 = {Wi,0,Wi,3 : i ∈ [0, 2)}
Z ′5 = {Wi,1,Wi,2 : i ∈ [0, 2)}
The transmission for demand vector D′ = (D′0, . . . , D
′
5) is
XD
′
=

WD′0,1 ⊕WD′2,2 ⊕WD′5,0
WD′1,0 ⊕WD′2,3 ⊕WD′4,1
WD′0,3 ⊕WD′3,0 ⊕WD′4,2
WD′1,2 ⊕WD′3,1 ⊕WD′5,3
 . (16)
For N = 2 files, A and B, we can create a private (3, 2; 1, 1) scheme as shown in Fig. 9.
A
B
A2, A3,
B2, B3
Z10
A1, A3,
B1, B3
Z00
A0, A2,
B0, B2
Z01
A0, A1,
B0, B1
Z11
A1, A2,
B1, B2
Z20
A0, A3,
B0, B3
Z21
B1 ‘ A2 ‘ A0
A0 ‘ A3 ‘ B1
B3 ‘ B0 ‘ B2
A2 ‘B1 ‘A3
User 0 User 1 User 2
Fig. 9. A (3, 2; 1, 1) private scheme for D = (A,A,B) from a (6, 2; 1, 1) non-private scheme from the PDA given in (15).
Example IV.6. Given in Table VIII is a 9× 9 PDA constructed using Lemma 17, from which we can create a demand-private
(3, 3; 53 , 1) coded-caching scheme as shown in Figure 10.
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A
B
C
A1, A4, A5, A6, A7,
B1, B4, B5, B6, B7,
C1, C4, C5, C6, C7
Z10
A1, A2, A3, A4, A7,
B1, B2, B3, B4, B7,
C1, C2, C3, C4, C7
Z00
A2, A3, A4, A5, A8,
B2, B3, B4, B5, B8,
C2, C3, C4, C5, C8
Z01
A0, A3, A4, A5, A6,
B0, B3, B4, B5, B6,
C0, C3, C4, C5, C6
Z02
A2, A5, A6, A7, A8,
B2, B5, B6, B7, B8,
C2, C5, C6, C7, C8
Z11
A0, A3, A6, A7, A8,
B0, B3, B6, B7, B8,
C0, C3, C6, C7, C8
Z12
A0, A1, A4, A7, A8,
B0, B1, B4, B7, B8,
C0, C1, C4, C7, C8
Z20
A0, A1, A2, A5, A8,
B0, B1, B2, B5, B8,
C0, C1, C2, C5, C8
Z21
A0, A1, A2, A3, A6,
B0, B1, B2, B3, B6,
C0, C1, C2, C3, C6
Z22
C6‘A3‘B2‘B8, B0‘A7‘B4‘C3,
C1‘C8‘C5‘A4, A2‘A0‘A6‘B5,
B6‘C3‘B1‘B7, B8‘C7‘A4‘C2,
C0‘A8‘B5‘A3, A1‘C0‘C6‘B4,
B5 ‘ C2 ‘A1 ‘A7
User 0 User 1 User 2
Fig. 10. A (3, 3; 5
3
, 1) private scheme forD = (A,B,C) from a (9, 3; 5
3
, 1) non-private scheme from the PDA given in Table VIII. Suppose caches Z02, Z12
and Z20 are selected as the caches for User 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The server transmission for the extended demand vector,D′ = {B,C,A,C,A,B,C,A,B}
helps users to recover the files they demanded.
V. GENERALIZATIONS: BEYOND DEMAND PRIVACY
The caching system we have considered so far has a single tier of users with uniform cache size, uniform file size and
the full privacy for all users regarding the user demands. In practical applications the setup and requirements could vary. We
consider a few such scenarios and analyse how the existing results could be applied there.
A. Partial privacy
In Section IV, we saw that there exist a trade-off between subpacketization and rate. There exists a similar trade-off between
subpacketization and privacy as well. The scheme modified from the non-private scheme can have less subpacketization if full
privacy is not needed. For instance, suppose that 2-file privacy suffices. That is, at the end of the multicast transmission, every
user has an ambiguity of one of two files about any other user’s demand. This would require lesser subpacketization.
For example, if N = 10 and K = 2, then a private scheme created using Corollary 5 would require the number of
users in the non-private scheme to be K ′ = NK = 20. With M = 5, such a scheme would require a subpacketization
f =
`
K′
K′M
N
˘
=
`
20
10
˘
= 184756. For 2-file privacy, we need to provide only two options to populate the cache content of
a user. Hence, we can use a (2N,K) non-private scheme to arrive at an (N,K) partially private scheme where any user’s
demand is possibly one of two files to another user. In this setup, K ′ = 2K = 4, and we can use a subpacketization as low as
f =
`
4
2
˘
= 6. In Fig. 11, we show a partially private (2, 4; 2, 2/3) scheme from a (4, 4; 2, 2/3) non-private scheme providing
an ambiguity of two files. These schemes are important particularly when we have large number of files compared to users.
B. Non-uniform privacy
A general setting of interest is when different users need different levels of privacy. As we have seen earlier, we need to
provide α options to populate the cache content of a user when that user needs α-file privacy. So the User k in a (K,N ;M,R)
coded caching scheme with non-uniform privacy is assured of αk-file privacy for αk ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We can design such a
scheme using a non-private (κ,N ;M,R) coded caching where
κ =
K−1∑
k=0
αk. (17)
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A
B
C
D
A01, A12,
A13, B01,
B12, B13,
C01, C12,
C13, D01,
D12, D13
Z01
A01, A02,
A03, B01,
B02, B03,
C01, C02,
C03, D01,
D02, D03
Z00
A02, A12,
A23, B02,
B12, B23,
C02, C12,
C23, D02,
D12, D23
Z10
A03, A13,
A23, B03,
B13, B23,
C03, C13,
C23, D03,
D13, D23
Z11
D12 ‘ B02 ‘ D01
D13 ‘ B03 ‘ C01
D23 ‘ D03 ‘ C02
B23 ‘D13 ‘ C12
User 0 User 1
Fig. 11. A (2, 4; 2, 2/3) partially private scheme from a (4, 4; 2, 2/3) non-private scheme. The scheme has a privacy of two files. The gray boxes show the
cache assigned by the server. The demands corresponding to unassigned caches for User k are selected at random from the set {Wj,j∈[N ]}\Dk . Transmission
shown is for the demand vector D = {B,D} and the extended demand vector D′ = {D,B,D,C}. Observe that cache contents Z00, Z01, Z10, Z11
recover the files D, B, D, C, respectively. From the point of view of the User 1, the User 0 could have requested either D or B giving the necessary privacy.
Theorem 20. If there exists a (κ,N ;M,R) coded caching scheme such that κ =
∑K−1
k=0 αk, then there exists a (K,N ;M,R)
caching scheme such that User k has αk-privacy.
Proof.
Example V.1. A (3, 2; 1, 2/3) caching system with non-uniform privacy obtained from a (4, 2; 1, 2/3) non-private scheme is
shown in Fig. 12. User 0 is assured of full privacy since it has two option to populate its cache. But User 1 and User 2 got
no privacy.
A
B
A01, A12,
A13, B01,
B12, B13
Z01
A01, A02,
A03, B01,
B02, B03
Z00
A02, A12,
A23, B02,
B12, B23
Z10
A03, A13,
A23, B03,
B13, B23
Z20
A12 ‘ B02 ‘ A01
A13 ‘ B03 ‘ B01
A23 ‘ A03 ‘ B02
B23 ‘A13 ‘B12
User 0 User 1 User 2
Fig. 12. A (3, 2; 1, 2/3) caching scheme with non-uniform privacy from a (4, 2; 1, 2/3) non-private scheme. The transmission corresponds to the demand
vector D = (B,A,B). User 0 is assured of full privacy while User 1 and User 2 has no privacy.
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C. Privacy with security
Vaishakh et. al. had proposed a coded caching scheme that ensured that the contents of a file remain secret to the users
unless they had requested it from the server [21]. We term this as content security in coded caching. We define a coded caching
scheme is private and secure when we have both demand privacy and content security.
The content private scheme proposed in [21] is actually three schemes for three regimes of cache memory M . Two of these
makes use of secret sharing. They define an (m,n)-secret sharing scheme wherein for each file n shares are created, each with
F
n−m bits, such that m shares do not reveal any information about the file, but n shares completely reveals the file. The three
regimes and their respective schemes are detailed below.
1. M = 1: The cache memory should be able to store at least one file for ensuring content security in a multicast. When
M = 1, we store cryptographic keys, Tk of F bits in each cache. i.e.,
Zk = Tk
During delivery phase, server sends
XD = {WDk ⊕ Tk,∀k ∈ [K]}
where Dk is the demand of User k. Here R = K.
2. M = N(K − 1): Here a (K − 1,K) secret sharing scheme is used. K shares of each file Wi are created, each of size
F bits. For j ∈ [K], j-th share of the file Wi is denoted by Sji . For each file Wi, User k stores all its shares except Ski .
Zk = {Sji , j ∈ [K], j 6= k}
During delivery the server transmits
XD = ⊕k∈[K]SkDk
resulting in R = 1.
3. 1 < M < N(K − 1) and M = NtK−t + 1 for t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K − 2}: Here a
´`
K−1
t−1
˘
,
`
K
t
˘¯
secret sharing scheme is used
to create
`
K
t
˘
shares. Size of each share is given by
Fs =
F`
K
t
˘−`K−1t−1 ˘ = Ft(K − t)`K−1t−1 ˘ bits.
For each file Wi, we denote its shares by Di fi {SLi : L ⊂ [K], |L|= t}. The content of cache of User k is given by
Zk = {SLi : i ∈ [N ], L ⊂ [K], |L|= t, k ∈ L}
For each subset V ⊂ [K] of users of size |V |= t+ 1, an independently and uniformly generated key TV of size Fs bits
is cached at each user k ∈ V . During the delivery phase the server transmits, for each such that
XD = {TV ⊕k∈V SV \{k}dk , V ⊆ [K], |V |= t+ 1}
Rate R = K1+t where t =
(M−1)K
(N+M−1) .
For any other value of M , we can employ time-sharing between the above schemes such that the convex hull of these (M,R)
pairs are achievable.
Theorem 21. The following (M,R) pairs and their convex hull is achievable for a private and secure (K,N) scheme.
• M = 1, R = K
• M = N(NK − 1), R = 1
• M = NtNK−t + 1, R =
NK
1+t for t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , NK − 2}
Proof. The content private scheme for M = 1 provides demand privacy as well. Hence the first (M,R) pair is achievable.
For the other two regimes, considering the content secure schemes, Scheme 2 and Scheme 3, as the non-private schemes in
Theorem 4, we can arrive at the (M,R) pairs listed in Theorem with privacy and security. With time sharing, their convex
hull also becomes achievable.
A comparison of the rate-memory tradeoff for these schemes is given in Figure 13.
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Fig. 13. Comparing rate-memory tradeoff for different levels of privacy when N = K = 12
D. Privacy in hierarchical coded caching
Karamchandani et al. devised a scheme to implement coded caching in hierarchical topology [13]. Here the server is
connected to K1 mirrors. A mirror is an intermediate node in a hierarchical topology which represents base stations, internet
service providers etc. Each mirror connected to K2 users through multicast links. There could be a limitation in cache memory
with users as well as the mirrors. Each mirror is having cache memory of M1F bits while that of each user is M2F bits.
This setting also suffers from user requests being revealed to other users and mirrors. We know how to achieve demand
privacy in a single tier caching system. Using a similar method, we can obtain private schemes for the hierarchical topology
from non-private hierarchical coded caching schemes. We denote a hierarchical coded caching scheme with K1 mirrors each
with K2 users, N files, mirror cache size M1, user cache size M2, rate between server and mirrors R1 and rate between a
mirror and its users R2 as a (K1,K2, N ;M1,M2, R1, R2) coded caching scheme. If a hierarchical scheme has demand privacy,
we call it a private hierarchical coded caching scheme.
We will use the caching and delivery functions from a (K1, NK2, N ;M1,M2, R1, R2) non-private hierarchical coded
caching scheme due to [13] to construct a (K1,K2, N ;M1,M2, R1, R2) private hierarchical scheme. The construction of
(K1,K2, N ;M1,M2, R1, R2) private hierarchical scheme is as follows. The scheme is a combination of two achievable
schemes, denoted as scheme A and scheme B. Scheme A, comprises of two single layer coded caching schemes, one between
the server and the mirrors and the second between each mirror and its users. Scheme B is a single layer coded caching scheme
between the server and all the users, where the storage at mirrors is ignored and mirrors only forward the part of transmission
useful for its users. Two parameters α and β dictate what fraction of each file and user memory respectively will be allocated
to these two schemes. For an achievable rate r(K,M,N) for single layer coded caching with K users, N files and cache
memory M , the expressions in Eq. (22) gives the achievable rate pair.
Note that each expression has two components, one from scheme A and the other from scheme B. For the three different
regimes of the memory sizes M1 and M2,
I) M1 +M2NK2 ≥ N and 0 < M1 ≤ N/4
II) M1 +M2NK2 < N
III) M1 +M2NK2 ≥ N and N/4 < M1 ≤ N
we will set the values of α and β as given below
pα?, β?q fi

`
M1
N ,
M1
N
˘
in regime I´
M1
M1+M2NK2
, 0
¯
in regime II`
M1
N ,
1
4
˘
in regime III
(18)
Then we have the following result on the achievable rate of private hierarchical coded caching schemes.
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Theorem 22. The following rates R1 and R2 are achievable for a private (K1,K2, N ;M1,M2, R1, R2) hierarchical scheme.
R1(α, β) fiαNK2 · r
ˆ
K1,
M1
α
,N
˙
+ (1− α) · r
ˆ
NK1K2,
(1− β)M2
(1− α) , N
˙
R2(α, β) fiα · r
ˆ
NK2,
βM2
α
,N
˙
+ (1− α) · r
ˆ
NK2,
(1− β)M2
(1− α) , N
˙
(19)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and r(K,M,N) is the optimal rate for single layer caching scheme with K users, N files and
each user with a cache memory M .
A
B
C
D
Mirror 0 Mirror 1
Z000
Z001
Z002
Z003
Z010
Z011
Z012
Z013
R1
User 0 User 1
Z100
Z101
Z102
Z103
Z110
Z111
Z112
Z113
User 2 User 3
R2 R2
Fig. 14. A (2, 2, 4; 2, 1, 0.665, 1.991) private hierarchical coded caching scheme obtained from non-private scheme with K1 = 2 and K2 = 8. The gray
boxes show the cache assigned by the server.
Proof. The proof uses the same idea for the single tier case. Since for the (K1, NK2, N ;M1,M2, R1, R2) non-private hierarchi-
cal scheme, rates R1 = R1(α, β) and R2 = R2(α, β) are achievable, it is also achievable for the (K1,K2, N ;M1,M2, R1, R2)
private hierarchical scheme made based on it. The demand privacy is derived from the fact that for each option of a user’s
cache, each of the N files could be recovered from the transmission. Since the cache assignment is private, demand also
remains private.
We now show an example of a (2, 2, 4; 2, 1, 0.665, 1.991) private hierarchical coded caching scheme as shown in Fig. 14.
These parameters corresponds to regime III. Using (18), we set α = 1/2 and β = 1/4. So half of the files will be transmitted
through scheme A and the other half through scheme B. In scheme A, since the mirrors could store all the files, R1A = 0. For
the transmission between mirror and users, the available memory is M2A = 14 resulting in a transmission of R2AF = 1.375F
bits. The available memory for scheme B is M2B = 34 resulting in transmission rates R1B = 0.6648 and R2B = 0.616.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the problem of demand privacy in systems employing coded caching techniques with a focus on
minimizing subpacketization. For the 2-user, 2-file case, we provided a new construction with a subpacketization of 3.
Additionally, we proved that the subpacketization of 3 is indeed minimal for a linear code for the 2-user, 2-file case. We
were able to demonstrate that coded prefetching has an edge over uncoded prefetching in this scenario. We had proposed
several construction schemes for PDAs that provides linear subpacketization for the caching schemes built from them. Also,
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we proposed partially private caching schemes and showed how to construct such private schemes with less subpacketization
in the general K-user, N -file case.
A lower bound on the rate and optimal scheme remains an open problem in demand private coded caching. The relationship
between subpacketization with other parameters also need to be well-characterised.
APPENDIX
Here we show that without coded prefetching we cannot obtain a private (2, 2; 1, 2/3) scheme with three subfiles and thereby
prove Lemma 3.
Informally, the proof is organized as follows. First, we show that without coded prefetching the subfiles must be cached in
an uncoded form i.e. without linear combinations. This restricts the possibilities for the caches. Furthermore any given cache
restricts the possibilities for the other user’s cache. Demand privacy is possible only if the set of caches consistent with a user
allow the reconstruction of both the files for any demand. We show that is not possible and hence a linear private (2, 2; 1, 2/3)
scheme with subpacketization of three subfiles does not exist.
A. Permissible caches without coded prefetching
Without coded prefetching, the subfiles can only be replicated in the cache. With three subfiles, M = 1 implies that each
user can store 3 subfiles. R = 2/3 implies that there are two independent subfile combinations in the transmission. If all the
subfiles in a cache belongs to a file, that user cannot recover the other file from a transmission of rate R = 2/3. So a cache
should contain two subfiles of one file and one subfile of the other file. Let the two files be A and B. Without loss of generality,
let us assume the cache of first user, Z0 contains two subfiles of file A and one subfile of B.
Z0 = {A0, A1, B2}. (20)
Let the cache of User 1 be
Z1 = {G0, G1, G2}, (21)
where Gi ∈ {A0, A1, A2, B0, B1, B2}.
Lemma 23. If Z0 = {A0, A1, B2}, then the permissible cache for Z1 must be one of the following.
Z1 = {G0, G1, A2 | G0, G1 ∈ {B0, B1, B2}} (22a)
or Z1 =
{
G0, G1, A2
ˇˇˇˇ
G0 ∈ {A0, A1}
G1 ∈ {B0, B1, B2}
}
. (22b)
.
Proof. Consider the transmission
XBA =
«
u
v
ff
=
«
α0A0 + α1A1 + α2A2 + β0B0 + β1B1 + β2B2
γ0A0 + γ1A1 + γ2A2 + δ0B0 + δ1B1 + δ2B2
ff
(23)
User 0 can use its cache contents to eliminate three variables from the system of linear equations in Eq. (23). The
reduced/equivalent equations for User 0 is «
u′
v′
ff
=
«
α2A2 + β0B0 + β1B1
γ2A2 + δ0B0 + δ1B1
ff
Since User 0 does not have access to A2, for recovering B0 and B1 we need
rk
˜«
β0 β1
δ0 δ1
ff¸
= 2 and
«
α2
γ2
ff
=
«
0
0
ff
(24)
The transmission XBA cannot involve A2. So A2 must be in Z1 for it to recover file A from XBA.
G2 = A2
All the subfiles in Z1 cannot be that of file A. So, we have two cases for the possible values of {G0, G1} based on the
associated files. Either both of them are subfiles of B as in Eq. (22a) or one of them is subfile of A and the other is of B as
in Eq.(22b).
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B. Two subfiles of file B in Z1
In this section, we will show that if the cache of User 1 is of the form given in Eq. (22a), then the scheme is not private.
Lemma 24. If Z0 = {A0, A1, B2}, and Z1 = {G0, G1, A2} and Gi ∈ {B0, B1, B2}, then demand privacy is not satisfied.
Proof. Let G0, G1 ∈ {B0, B1, B2}. The reduced equations corresponding to XBA for User 1 will be«
u′′
v′′
ff
=
«
α0A0 + α1A1 + β0B0 + β1B1 + β2B2
γ0A0 + γ1A1 + δ0B0 + δ1B1 + δ2B2
ff
(25)
For User 1 being able to obtain subfiles A0 and A1 from the transmission, we need
rk
˜«
α0 α1
γ0 γ1
ff¸
= 2, and (26a)«
β2
δ2
ff
=
«
0
0
ff
(26b)
Due to Eq. (24), Z2 must contain the subfiles B0 and B1, for eliminating those variables from XBA and recover the subfiles
of A.
{G0, G1} = {B0, B1} (27)
Now consider the transmission for D = (A,A).
XAA =
«
u
v
ff
=
«
α′0A0 + α
′
1A1 + α
′
2A2 + β
′
0B0 + β
′
1B1 + β
′
2B2
γ′0A0 + γ
′
1A1 + γ
′
2A2 + δ
′
0B0 + δ
′
1B1 + δ
′
2B2
ff
For User 1, reduced equations are «
u′′
v′′
ff
=
«
α′0A0 + α
′
1A1 + β
′
2B2
γ′0A0 + γ
′
1A1 + δ
′
2B2
ff
(28)
For User 1 recovering A0 and A1, it requires
rk
˜«
α′0 α
′
1
γ′0 γ
′
1
ff¸
= 2 and (29a)«
β′2
δ′2
ff
=
«
0
0
ff
(29b)
For demand privacy we require the existence of some cache Z ′1 which can recover file B from X
AA. Since XAA doesn’t
involve B2, it must be present in Z ′.
Z ′1 = {H0, B2, A2}
For no value of H0 ∈ {B0, B1, A0, A1}, it can recover both B0 and B1 (or file B completely) from XAA due to Eq. (29a).
Thus, if Z0 has two subfiles of A, Z1 cannot contain two subfiles of B as given in Eq. (22a).
C. Two subfiles of file A in Z1
If the cache of User 1 is of the form given in Eq. (22b), then we can restrict the cache even further as the following lemma
shows.
Lemma 25. If Z0 = {A0, A1, B2}, then the permissible cache for Z1 must be of the form Z1 = {G0, G1, A2}, where G0, G1
are distinct and G0 ∈ {A0, A1} and G1 ∈ {B0, B1}.
Proof. We need to show G1 6= B2. Since Z1 already contains A2, it can have either A0 or A1, both of which are in Z0.
Without loss of generality, let G0 = A1. Assume G1 = B2. Then Z1 = {B2, A1, A2} Consider the transmission
XAB =
«
u
v
ff
=
«
α0A0 + α1A1 + α2A2 + β0B0 + β1B1 + β2B2
γ0A0 + γ1A1 + γ2A2 + δ0B0 + δ1B1 + δ2B2
ff
(30)
For User 0, these equations reduces to «
u′
v′
ff
=
«
α2A2 + β0B0 + β1B1
γ2A2 + δ0B0 + δ1B1
ff
(31)
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Since User 0 have no access to B0 and B1, for recovering A2, we need
rk
˜«
β0 β1
δ0 δ1
ff¸
≤ 1 and (32a)«
α2
γ2
ff
6=
«
0
0
ff
(32b)
For User 1 the equations from XAB reduces to«
u′′
v′′
ff
=
«
α0A0 + β0B0 + β1B1
γ0A0 + δ0B0 + δ1B1
ff
(33)
For User 1 recovering B0 and B1, it requires
rk
˜«
β0 β1
δ0 δ1
ff¸
= 2 and (34a)«
α0
γ0
ff
=
«
0
0
ff
(34b)
Equations (34a) and (32a) are contradictory, Hence G1 6= B2. So G1 ∈ {B0, B1}.
By Lemma 25, there are four possible choices for Z1 as given below.
Za = {A1, A2, B0} (35a)
Zb = {A1, A2, B1} (35b)
Zc = {A0, A2, B0} (35c)
Zd = {A0, A2, B1} (35d)
Lemma 26. If Z0 = {A0, A1, B2} and Z1 ∈ {Za, Zb, Zc, Zd}, then demand privacy is not possible.
Proof. It suffices to show demand privacy is not possible for Z1 = Za, since we can arrive at the other cache combinations
by relabeling.
Suppose the cache Za = {A1, A2, B0} is assigned to the User 1. Then, by arguments similar to Lemmas 23,24 and 25, the
User 1 is aware that the cache of User 0 must have two subfiles of A, with one being A0 and the subfile of B in Z0 is not
B0. The four possible caches for Z0 consistent with Z1 = Za are given below.
Ze = {A0, A1, B1} (36a)
Zf = {A0, A1, B2} (36b)
Zg = {A0, A2, B1} (36c)
Zh = {A0, A2, B2} (36d)
Note that Z0 = Zf . For demand privacy we need the caches consistent with Z0 to be able to recover both files and vice versa.
Consider the transmission
XAB =
«
u
v
ff
=
«
α0A0 + α1A1 + α2A2 + β0B0 + β1B1 + β2B2
γ0A0 + γ1A1 + γ2A2 + δ0B0 + δ1B1 + δ2B2
ff
(37)
For the User 0 with cache Z0 = {A0, A1, B2} the transmission XAB reduces to the following set of equations after
eliminating the subfiles which are already present in Z0.«
u0
v0
ff
=
«
α2A2 + β0B0 + β1B1
γ2A2 + δ0B0 + δ1B1
ff
(38)
For User 0 whose demand is A already has A0 and A1. Only A2 needs to be recovered from XAB . This is possible only if
the following conditions are satisfied.
rk
˜«
β0 β1
δ0 δ1
ff¸
≤ 1 and (39a)«
α2
γ2
ff
6=
«
0
0
ff
(39b)
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Similarly, for the User 1, whose cache is Z1 = Za, the transmission XAB reduces to«
u1
v1
ff
=
«
α0A0 + β1B1 + β2B2
γ0A0 + δ1B1 + δ2B2
ff
(40)
For User 1 to recover B0 and B1, the following conditions must be satisfied.
rk
˜«
β1 β2
δ1 δ2
ff¸
= 2 and (41a)«
α0
γ0
ff
=
«
0
0
ff
(41b)
The reduced equations for Zb are «
ub
vb
ff
=
«
α0A0 + β0B0 + β2B2
γ0A0 + δ0B0 + δ2B2
ff
(42)
The reduced equations for Zc are «
uc
vc
ff
=
«
α1A1 + β1B1 + β2B2
γ1A1 + δ1B1 + δ2B2
ff
(43)
The reduced equations for Zd = Zg are «
ud
vd
ff
=
«
α1A1 + β0B0 + β2B2
γ1A1 + δ0B0 + δ2B2
ff
(44)
The reduced equations for Ze are «
ue
ve
ff
=
«
α2A2 + β0B0 + β2B2
γ2A2 + δ0B0 + δ2B2
ff
(45)
The reduced equations for Zh are «
uh
vh
ff
=
«
α1A1 + β0B0 + β1B1
γ1A1 + δ0B0 + δ1B1
ff
(46)
From the above constraints and the reduced equations for all users we can infer the following.
1) Due to Eq. (41b), Zb cannot recover file A since it has no access to A0.
2) Due to Eq. (41a), and since Zc has no access to B1 and B2, it cannot cannot eliminate them from the transmission to
recover file A.
3) Due to Eq. (39b), Ze cannot recover file B.
4) Due to Eq. (39a), Zh cannot recover file B.
Hence, from the four possible caches for Z1, the only cache that might be able to recover file A and might achieve privacy
for User 1 is Zd. But since there are only five equations from the cache and transmissions, it is impossible for Zd to recover
all the six subfiles A0, A1, A2, B0, B1, B2 and thus recover file B also. That means, no possible cache for User 0 consistent
with Z1 is able to recover file B from XAB . This results in no demand privacy for User 0.
On the other hand, if XAB is such that Zd can recover file B, then it results in no privacy for User 1.
Note that any consistent set of caches for User 0 and User 1 can be obtained by permuting subfile labels of file A and file
B (permutation piA to relabel A and piB to relabel B). Applying the same relabeling, the above proof will hold true for them
as well. This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
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